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Research Summary
Fire case studies are valued both for firefighter training and for validation of fire behavior models. The Butte City Fire started on July 1, 1994, west of Idaho Falls, 10, from a burning flat tire. The blaze was driven by 25 to 35 mile per hour winds, with peak gusts of 60 miles per hour. The fire covered over 20,500 acres in less than 6.5 hours with spread rates as high as 490 ft per minute and flame lengths greater than 40 ft. The area where the fire ocurred is part of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and is characterized as high desert rangeland with sagebrush (Artemisia tridentata ssp. wyomingensis) as the principal shrub species. Wind and air temperature information was gathered at 5 minute intervals from eight remote, automatic meteorological stations positioned on and around the laboratory site. Wind-driven soil erosion rates of 75 tons per acre were measured during the weeks following the fire. REPORT ------------------------------- 11 . Contract(C) or Grant(G) No.
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1&. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)
The Butte City Fire occurred on July 1, 1994, west of Idaho Falls, ID. Ignited from a burning flat tire, the blaze was driven by high winds that caused it to cover over 20,500 aores in just over 6.5 hours. Sagebrush (Artemisia tridentata ssp. wyomingensis) is the principal shrub species of this high dese~t rangeland. With the absence of vegetation after the fire, erosion increased tremendously. Because the fire occurred on the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, researchers were able to gather weather informatoin from remote meteorological stations positioned on and around the site. 
------------------------
Many researchers present repeated arguments in favor of documented fire case studies (Alexander 1987; Chandler 1976; Thomas 1994) . We present this case study ofthe Butte City Fire that occurred July 1, 1994, about 60 miles west of Idaho Falls, ID, on the U.S. Department of Energy's Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (lNEL). Most ofthe burned area was managed for grazing by the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management. This fire should not be confused with the Butte Fire that occurred on the Salmon National Forest during August 1985 (Mutch and Rothermel 1986 ). We present information on fuels, weather and topography related to the fire, and a comparison between predicted and observed fire spread rates.
On July 1, 1994, at 3:38 p.m. mountain daylight time (MDT), a fire started on a flat tire on a horse trailer pulled behind a vehicle traveling on State Highway 20. The driver stopped the vehicle, removed the tire and let it roll off the road down an embankment into some grass and sagebrush. This ignited a fire on the INEL. At 3:44 p.m., the INEL Fire Department helicopter was dispatched to the scene. The helicopter pilot reported the fire to be approximately 1 acre.
The area's terrain is flat, high elevation desert with sagebrush and native bunchgrasses on basalt. Weather, when the fire began, consisted of winds from the south-southwest at nearly 23 miles per hour measured 50 ft above ground level, air temperature of 89 of and relative humidity of 10 percent. The strong winds pushed the fire rapidly to the northeast. Flame lengths, estimated to be 5 to 7 ft when firefighters arrived on the scene, soon increased, with some reports of 30 to 40 ft flame lengths.
Fire behavior was characterized by a rapid acceleration from ignition to a high intensity fast-moving fire. An average spread rate for the burn's duration was 162 ft per minute, with short term spread rates as high as 490 ft per minute. Suppression efforts consisted of flanking actions. The initial run lasted approximately 6.5 hours, during which the fire covered more than 12 miles and burned over 20,500 acres.
Although small in terms of total area burned, this fire is unusual among wildfires in that detailed fuels and weather information is available. Besides having a research mission related to nuclear development and associated processes, the INEL is a National Environmental Research Park and serves as an outdoor ecological research laboratory. This designation has focused efforts characterizing plant and animal populations around the site, which has led to the development of a detailed vegetation class map. Additionally, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Air Resources Laboratory in Idaho Falls closely monitors meteorological conditions in and around the INEL site. Because of these efforts, detailed fuel and weather information not usually available on wildfires is accessible. We present some of this information.
A chronology of the fire behavior during the initial run follows. Then the predicted spread rates from the BE"HA VE fire behavior prediction system (Andrews 1986) are compared against observed rates of spread. Finally, postfire effects, such as soil erosion and changes in vegetation class distribution, are briefly discussed.
The Fire Environment --------------
The INEL encompasses 890 square miles of sagebrush-steppe rangeland managed by the U.S. Department of Energy for the purpose of conducting nuclear energy related research and development. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Air Resources Laboratory has deployed a sophisticated network of 31 meteorological monitoring stations in and around the INEL to track and predict air movement patterns. Information from these stations is gathered 24 hours a day and is recorded at 5 minute intervals. Because the INELis also a National Environmental Research Park, detailed studies of the biota are conducted on the laboratory site and surrounding lands (Reynolds and Morris 1995) . As part of these efforts, detailed plant inventories have been completed.
Initially, when the fire was detected, firefighters were concerned about INEL work sites ( fig. 1) facility complexes (including the Central Facilities Area, the Test Reactor Area, and the Naval Reactors Facility) that housed personnel, equipment, and in some cases, toxic substances were at potential risk. Firebreaks existed around the periphery of the facilities; however, the risk of spotting across these breaks was a concern. Additionally, the community of Howe and highways to the west and north of the site were at risk.
Fuels
Although 20 vegetation types have been described on the INEL (McBride and others 1978), the site is 2 dominated by sagebrush and other shrubs (Anderson and others 1996) . A detailed map of the vegetation classes and their distribution over the fire area is included in appendix A. Figure 2 shows typical fuels for this site. Mature sagebrush-steppe (Artemisia tridentata ssp. wyomingensis), on and offlava, occurs on over 90 percent ofthe bum site. Rabbitbrush (Chrysothamnus sp.) and various bunchgrasses constitute much of the remainder of the vegetative community.
Total fuel loading has historically averaged 1,300 to 1,400 lb per acre. However, due to a low snow pack the previous winter (1993 to 1994) , the dead fine fuels (such as grasses) from the previous year remained standing. By June 1994, the new growth had combined with the previous year's standing growth to result in a total fuel load of approximately 2,000 lb per acre (Glenn 1995) .
Fuel Moisture
At the time of the fire, calculations based on "on site" dry bulb temperatures and relative humidities were used to estimate 1 hour timelag (0 to 0.25 inch diameter) and 10 hour timelag (0.25 to 1 inch diameter) dead fuel moisture contents of 1 and 2 percent, respectively (NWCG 1992) . These "on site" estimates were used for all fire behavior predictions.
The live fuel moisture content of sagebrush is sampled every 2 weeks by the Bureau of Land Management's Idaho Falls District as part of the Great Basin Live Fuel Moisture Project (1994) . Figure 3 shows live fuel (sagebrush) moisture contents recorded just south of the burn site at Table Legs Butte. During mid-June, live fuel moisture content was 146 percent. By July 1, 1994, it had decreased to 69 percent, the lowest measured level for early July since the sampling project began 5 years earlier. The 5 year average indicates that such low levels are not typically reached until much later in the season (mid to late September).
3
Weather
The National Weather Service (1994) reported total precipitation in eastern Idaho during the 1993 to 1994 winter to be 50 to 75 percent of normal. Spring temperatures were 4 to 6 OF above normal, and spring precipitation was approximately 50 percent of norma I. By June 25, 1994, the Palmer Drought Severity Index (Palmer 1965 ) was minus 5.8, indicating extreme drought conditions. The Keetch-Byram Drought Index (Keetch and Byram 1968) , as reported by the National Weather Service (1994), also indicated that the region was experiencing extreme drought.
One unique aspect ofthe INEL site relative to other wildfire locations is the presence of 31 remote meteorological stations (eight are shown in fig. 1 ). Each station provides the following measurements every 5 minutes: average windspeed, wind direction, maximum gust, and air temperature 50 ft above ground; and air temperature, relative humidity, and insolation 6.5 ft above ground. Although not all sensors were reporting at the time of the fire, windspeed and direction were reported by all stations in the fire's vicinity.
The meteorological stations in this area commonly register complex flow. While the terrain that was directly in the fire's path is relatively flat, there are mountains along the INEL's west border. The southwesterly wind coming onto the site is accelerated and becomes more southerly as it follows the edge of the mountains. This effect was one factor that resulted in a reduced fire threat to some of the INEL facilities.
Two meteorological stations were actually overburned by the fire (DEA and BAS; see figure 1 for explanation of acronyms). Initially, we hoped that we could estimate the fire spread rate by comparing the temperature readings from these towers. But after reviewing the fire perimeter information, it appeared that the DEA station was overburned by the fire's flank. The BAS station, on the other hand, was overburned by the fire front; it provided local windspeed measurements at the fire's front.
The DEA, BAS, NRF, and TRA stations were nearest to the fire ( fig. 4 ). Wind and temperature data from these stations are shown in figure 5a-d and in appendix B, which includes additional data from other stations around the fire site.
Winds at ignition were southwesterly at 20 to 27 miles per hour ( fig. 5a ). The winds gradually increased 4 to 25 to 32 miles per hour over the next 2 hours and then remained nearly constant until about 7:00 p.m. when they decreased sharply to 5 to 10 miles per hour. Air temperatures were 89 OF when the fire started. Temperatures held steady over the next 3 hours then gradually decreased to approximately 60 OF over the last hours of the active burning period.
Fire Narrative ________ _
Fire locations were estimated from shift and dispatcher reports taken during the fire and from interviews with INEL and Bureau of Land Management personnel working on the fire. Figure 4 shows the estimated locations of the fire front. fig. 5a ). Within 4 minutes the fire had grown to over 100 acres.
At 4: 11 p.m., statements from the INEL Fire Department dispatcher place the fire front 2 to 3 miles northeast of the ignition point. An air tanker was requested. Meanwhile the wind had increased to over 30 miles per hour At 4:34 p.m., the air tanker arrived and dropped retardant on the northeast edge of the fire. One INEL firefighter reported: "The two drops ... slowed the fire down so we could mop it up. As I was leaving the fire, some of the areas had rekindled." Other firefighters on the INEL Fire Department brush units in the immediate vicinity of the drop reported that although the fire may have been slowed 5 by the retardant, it quickly recovered and continued burning with 6 ft or higher flame lengths.
One hour later (5:25 p.m.), the flames along the west flank were reported to be 15 to 30 ft tall and 200 to 300 ft deep. Winds were 22 to 28 miles per hour with gusts to 60 miles per hour ( fig. 5a ,b). The helicopter pilots reported that the fire front had burned over the Utah Power Company powerline ( fig. 1 ). The sharp jumps in windspeed, wind gusts, and air temperatures at the BAS meteorological station clearly indicate the arrival of the fire front ( fig. 5b ). Five minute average windspeeds were measured at 25 to 30 miles per hour.
The combination of wind and buoyant forces induced intense turbulence at the fire front; this turbulence contributed to increased fire intensity and spread. Immediately after the fire front passed, average 
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CD C -windspeeds were measured at 30 miles per hour (an increase of 8 miles per hour over the prefire winds). The increase in wind behind the front was not shown by the DEA station because it was not overburned by the head of the fire but by a flanking fire. Eyewitness accounts suggest that the rate of spread was approximately 290 ft per minute between the DEA and BAS stations. At 6:50 p.m., the overhead powerline to Howe Peak failed; either the powerline wires melted and separated or some of the poles collapsed, causing the emergency generator in the repeater station to start. The helicopter pilot reported that large fire whirls were just behind the fire front and that the fire " .. .is very big and threatening the west side of Highway 33." Flames along the southeast flank were 10 ft. Shortly thereafter the fire spotted across Highway 33 and began to spread along the highway with flanking runs moving northwest into the foothills. Retardant drops along the west flank and actions by Bureau of Land Management fire crews stopped further westward spread. About 7:00 p.m., winds began to decrease. By 7:50 p.m., fire crews reported that flame lengths had decreased to 3 ft, but the fire was still moving too fast for brush crews to catch the fire front.
Attempts by fire personnel to access the burned area as late as 10:40 p.m. along the UP&L powerline were blocked by significant flaming. Brush units continued attacking along the east flank until approximately 10:30 p.m. By this time the winds had decreased to less than 15 miles per hour and air temperatures were less than 70 of ( fig. 5a ,b,c). By 6:00 a.m. the next day, no flaming combustion was observed on the burn site.
Discussion
--------------------------
Fire Behavior
Fire behavior on the Butte City Fire during the first 30 minutes consisted of an acceleration phase characterized by fire spread rates as high as 490 ft per minute as the fire accelerated from the ignition point. This was followed by a quasi steady burning phase wherein the fire moved at a steady rate until the winds and amount of combustible vegetation decreased. The following discussion compares observed rates of spread against predicted values ofspread using the BEHAVE fire behavior prediction system (Andrews 1986).
BEHAVE fuel model 2 most closely represents the fuels present in the area of the Butte City Fire (Glenn 1995) . In his description of this fuel type, Anderson (1982) states: "Fire spread is primarily through the fine herbaceous fuels ... such stands may include clumps of fuels that generate higher intensities and that may produce firebrands." This description resembles the 7 fuels and the fire spread mechanism observed by firefighters on the Butte City Fire.
During the majority of its run, the fire was moving so fast that firefighters were never able to safely catch and attack the fire's head. The Fire Behavior and Tactics guide included in the Great Basin Live Fuel Moisture Project (1994) provides six fire classifications as a function of live fuel moisture content. For moisture contents below 74 percent, "Fires will exhibit ADVANCED FIRE BEHAVIOR with high potential to control their environment. Large acreage will be consumed in very short time periods. Backfiring from indirect line, roads, and so forth, must be considered. Aircraft will need to be cautious of hazardous turbulence around the fire." This closely describes conditions observed on the Butte City Fire.
The spread rates of nearly 490 ft per minute, observed early in the fire, were caused by direct exposure of the fire front to the driving wind. Although winds generally increased slightly over the next 2 hours, the observed spread rates dropped by nearly 30 percent, which can be attributed to the blocking ofthe horizontal movement of the air mass by the smoke column produced by the fire. The general effect was to reduce the fire's rate of spread.
The spike in the 6.5 ft temperature trace at 5:45 p.m. indicated the fire front's arrival at the BAS meteorological station ( fig. 5b) . At the same time, windspeed increased from 23 to approximately 30 miles per hour; this was unique to the BAS station. The increase in average windspeed and a sharp jump in maximum wind gust coincides with the jump in temperature. This suggests that these factors were associated with the fire front and also illustrates the strong turbulence at the fire front. As the air was convected upward in the smoke column, a local low pressure region was formed near the ground just behind the fire front. This caused increased turbulence and windspeed directly behind the fire front. So, while the development of a large smoke column above the fire front blocked the general wind acting on the fire front, the air rushing in behind the fire to replace that convected upward in the column increased turbulence and windspeed in a localized region just behind the fire front. The effect was a generally slower spread rate from that observed early in the fire, but possibly higher flame turbulence and lengths. Table 1 presents input and output from the BE-HAVE fire behavior prediction system runs. The data represent a parametric study of the effect of fine dead fuel and live fuel moisture contents on the predicted spread rate accuracy. Live herbaceous moisture content measurements were obtained from field measurements made as part of an ongoing live fuel monitoring program. Windspeeds commonly quoted by the weather service are measured at 20 ft above the ground or aSensitivity study of the predicted fire behavior compared to the dead fuel moisture content, which is shown in bold.
bComparison of predicted spread rates as a function of live moisture content, which is shown in bold.
vegetation canopy. Because 50 ft windspeeds, rather than 20 ft, were measured by the meteorological stations, the 50 ft values were reduced by 0.85 to obtain the equivalent 20 ft windspeed. This correction was calculated from the logarithmic wind profile suggested by Albini and Baughman (1979) . Then, a wind adjustment factor of 0.4, as suggested by Rothermel (1983) and Baughman (1980) , was applied to the estimated 20 ft wind speeds to obtain the mid flame windspeed. We questioned the relative importance of the dead fuel moisture content levels relating to the accuracy of the predicted spread rates. The first three columns of table 1 represent a sensitivity study of the predicted fire behavior values compared to the dead fuel moisture content (shown in bold). The moisture contents used for this fire were calculated from temperature and relative humidity measurements made "on site."
The results indicate that the model is relatively sensitive to dead fuel moisture content. An increase in 1 hour through 100 hour timelag fuels by 1 percent results in an 8 percent decrease in the predicted spread rate. A 2 percent increase in dead fuel moisture contents results in a 23 percent decrease in predicted spread rate.
The last three columns of table 1 show a comparison of predicted spread rates as a function of live fuel moisture content (shown in bold). In general, a 25 percent change in live fuel moisture content will cause a proportional 8 percent change in fire spread rate. This suggests that for this fuel type, predicted rate of spread is not highly sensitive to live fuel moisture content. This implies that reasonable predictions of fire spread can be obtained even when using estimated 8 live fuel moisture contents based on measurements and weather during the preceding days and weeks. Table 2 presents predicted and observed spread rates. Observed rates of spread were calculated by identifying fire front locations and times from the firefighter statements and dispatch logs. The BE-HAVE fire behavior prediction system was used to make two sets of predictions: the first using average wind data and the second using maximum wind gust.
With the exception of winds peed, the fuel conditions used for these predictions were the same as those listed in the first column of table 1. The windspeeds used in these predictions were taken from the meteorological station nearest the fire front at the time of interest ( fig. 5a,b) . In general, for these input conditions, a 10 percent change in windspeed will result in a corresponding 20 percent change in the predicted spread rate.
The results from this first set of predictions are listed in table 2 under the column titled "Predicted using average windspeed." The model is not accurate when used to predict spread rates associated with acceleration from a point ignition to quasisteady conditions. This is indicated in figure 6 where the predicted spread rate 30 minutes after ignition is approximately one halfthe observed value. One and a quarter hours later (5:25 p.m.), the predicted spread rate is 73 percent of the observed value. However, as the fire continues to bum (the next 4 hours), the predicted spread rate matches the observed value to within 7 percent. These data clearly demonstrate that the fire spread rate model is a useful tool for predicting steady state fire spread rates, but it is not accurate during the early phase when a fire is accelerating from a point ignition (Rothermel 1972) . A second BEHAVE run using maximum wind gusts rather than average winds peed underpredicted the extremely high initial values and overpredicted the steady state spread rates. These data are listed in the last column of table 2 and are also shown in figure 6 . During the period of steady state fire spread, the spread rates predicted using the maximum wind gust were as much as 70 percent higher than the observed values. These observations indicate that maximum wind gusts are not appropriate for BEHAVE fire Figure 7 is a Fire Characteristics Chart. Fireline intensities on the Butte City Fire, shown in the shaded ellipse, were between 2,000 and 3,000 Btu/ft-s. Spread rates varied from 63 to 290 ft per minute. Control problems associated with the fire are well described by Andrews and Rothermel (1982) : " ... for fireline intensities greater than 1,000 Btu/ft-s, control efforts at the head of the fire are ineffective." This was the case with the Butte City Fire until very late in the burning period when firefighters were able to successfully attack the fire's flank with ground-based equipment. Following Rothermel (1991) guidelines, the power of the wind was found to be more than double that of the fire. Rothermel (1991) indicates that if a fire is clearly wind-dominated, flanking actions are often the only option available to firefighters. This aptly describes conditions on the Butte City Fire. However, if the power of the fire is greater than that of the wind, suppression actions should focus on fuel reduction ahead of the fire front. Thus, calculation of the power of wind to power of fire ratio can be useful in deciding attack options. As a note of interest, if the windspeed had been nearer 10 miles per hour in these fuels, the power of wind to power of fire ratio would have been approximately 0.7. The fire could then be controlled using ground-based equipment and fuel reduction techniques.
Most "problem" fires in these fuel types will be winddominated. Nevertheless, one should calculate the power ratio to serve as an aid in selecting fire control options. Although the crown fire nomograms as presented by Rothermel (1991) are not appropriate for this fuel type, the methods for calculating the power of the wind and power of the fire are.
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Fire Effects
Sagebrush-grass vegetation types occupy nearly 100 million acres in the Western United States (Wright and Bailey 1982) . Fire frequency for pre-European settlement in sagebrush-grass communities on the Snake River plain in eastern Idaho has been estimated at 20 to 25 years (Houston 1973) . During the last century, this interval has lengthened significantly due to effective fire suppression. The result has been a change toward sagebrush-dominated communities and fewer fire adapted plants, such as rabbitbrush and horsebrush (Harniss and Murray 1973; Houston 1973) .
After the Butte City Fire was extinguished, questions arose regarding the long-term effects on local plant and animal communities. The Department of Energy has taken great care and effort to protect the native plant and animal populations found on the INEL site. The most dramatic effect of the Butte City Fire was the nearly complete consumption of all vegetation both dead and live; the exposed vegetation was consumed down to the soil level, and the postburn area resembled a moonscape ( fig. 8) . Due to the lack of soil-anchoring vegetation, wind erosion in the weeks following the bum removed more than 3 inches of topsoil. Soil erosion rates as high as 75 tons per acre per month (nearly 0.5 inches per month), were measured at some locations (Jeppesen 1994) . These were the highest wind-caused soil erosion rates ever monitored in the Bureau of Land Management Idaho Falls District. During this time, commercial aircraft flying over the area reported dust plumes reaching 5,000 ft above ground level on windy days (Jeppesen 1994) . Subsurface grass and shrub root structures were exposed within 1 month. Soil erosion nearly stopped with the vegetational sprouting and growth in spring 1995.
Fire occurrence in sagebrush grasslands results in preferential growth of resprouting perennials and annuals with soil seed reservoirs (Wright and Bailey 1982) . We expected that regrowth would consistlargely of bunchgrasses and rabbitbrush because sagebrush had been totally eliminated from the site and it does not normally resprout. One major question immediately after the bum concerned the necessity for reseedingto minimize soil erosion and to initiate native plant regrowth while inhibiting encroachment of exotic species. However, others have compared seeded and unseeded sites on similar ecosystems and have found 11 that seeding is not necessary (Ratzlaff and Anderson 1995) .
A significant regrowth of native grass species did occur the following year without reseeding. A 21 percent canopy cover of bunchgrasses and forbs (such as rabbitbrush and horsebrush) has been reported (Anderson and others 1996) . A 33 percent cover has been measured on adjacent unburned areas. It appears that the grass and forb species will reach preburn density levels within a few years after the burn. However, the shrub component will require a significantly longer regeneration period. The spring of 1995 was relatively wet, which provided plenty of water for plant growth. Grass grew greater than 3 ft. This "new" fuel bed has some significance with respect to the potential fire behavior. The lack of any appreciable shrubs suggests that a fuel model containing more grass is appropriate (such as a BEHAVE fuel model 1 or 3). This change in the fuel complex could result in a doubling or possible tripling of the fire spread rate, but intensities can be expected to be lower than exhibited by the Butte City Fire. It is likely that the grass-dominated vegetative community will be more fire resistant, implying less likelihood of repeated extreme soil erosion rates such as occurred after the Butte City Fire.
Conclusions
The rapid growth of the Butte City Fire was impressive from a fire behavior point of view and potentially dangerous from a fire protection point of view; however, such behavior (spread rates and flame intensities) is typical of wildfires in these fuel types. The fire behavior was extreme but understandable when using readily available predictive models. Similar fire behavior can be expected to occur, given strong winds, in these fuel types during almost any fire season. A nearly identical ignition occurred in August 1995 on the INEL. Again, southwesterly winds caused the ignition to quickly develop into a wind-driven fire front that spread over approximately 6,800 acres within 4 hours. The scenario was repeated in July 1996 when nearly 40,000 acres were burned in another fire on the INEL site. 
